Learning at home and abroad: How competition conditions the diffusion of party strategies by Juhl, Sebastian & Williams, Laron K.
ARTICLE
Learning at Home and Abroad: How Competition
Conditions the Diffusion of Party Strategies
Sebastian Juhl1* and Laron K. Williams2
1Collaborative Research Center 884, University of Mannheim, Germany and 2Department of Political Science, University of
Missouri, Columbia, MO, USA
*Corresponding author. E-mail: sebastian.juhl@gess.uni-mannheim.de
(Received 26 May 2020; revised 15 September 2020; accepted 4 November 2020)
How do parties decide when to campaign on valence issues given high degrees of uncertainty? Although
past studies have provided evidence of transnational emulation of parties’ position-taking strategies, these
findings do not directly apply to saliency strategies. Moreover, the exact diffusion mechanism remains
largely elusive. Based on the issue saliency literature, this study develops novel theoretical propositions
and argues that conscious learning enables parties to infer the relative utility of emphasizing consensual
issues during an electoral campaign. The proposed theory gives rise to different expectations at the domes-
tic and transnational levels because of the distinct logic of issue competition. By analyzing environmental
issue emphasis in party manifestos, the authors find direct transnational dependencies and indirect
spillover effects among the parties’ saliency strategies. They identify conscious learning, rather than
mere imitation or independent decision making, as the diffusion mechanism at work. Yet, in line with
saliency-based theories, electoral competition mutes the diffusion of electoral strategies domestically.
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Uncertainty is a pervasive feature of democratic elections. When crafting their manifestos, parties
lack the information necessary to unambiguously identify an optimal vote-maximizing strategy
(Laver and Sergenti 2012; Somer-Topcu 2009; Budge 1994). To mitigate this problem, parties
can utilize information on the past electoral performance of other parties both within and outside
their domestic party system. Numerous studies on policy diffusion empirically demonstrate that
parties rely on such heuristics and emulate each other’s position-taking strategies (for example,
Berry and Baybeck 2005; Böhmelt et al. 2016; Böhmelt et al. 2017; Butler et al. 2017; Ezrow
et al. 2019; Gilardi 2010; Volden, Ting and Carpenter 2008).
Yet these studies are confined to positional issues, on which parties attempt to distinguish
their ideological profile – typically on a left–right dimension – from that of their competitors.
Consequently, the extent to which the findings are generalizable to consensual (so-called valence)
issues (Stokes 1963, 373) remains largely unknown as they do not fit the logic of the Downsian
model of party competition. In addition, the literature is inconclusive regarding the precise mech-
anism underlying the diffusion process. Empirical research has yet to develop strategies that
enable researchers to differentiate conscious learning from mere imitation or even independent
decision making (Graham, Shipan and Volden 2013; Shipan and Volden 2008; Volden, Ting
and Carpenter 2008).
Against this background, the present study explores how parties decide on the optimal issue
saliency strategy in an electoral campaign. We combine insights from saliency-based theories
of party competition (for example, Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996; Robertson 1976)
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and the agenda-setting literature (for example, Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010;
Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2015) with models of learning and intergovernmental policy dif-
fusion (for example, Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Gilardi 2010; Volden, Ting and Carpenter 2008)
to develop a theory that identifies transnational learning as a mechanism to mitigate electoral
uncertainty. Parties do not decide on a strategy in isolation: they draw on their own history of
strategic decisions and observe other parties’ electoral fortunes. These sources of information
help parties gauge the relative benefit of emphasizing valence issues.
Importantly, since the logic of party competition differs between positional and valence issues, our
theory offers novel predictions about parties’ ability to learn from other parties domestically. In con-
trast to position-taking strategies, we argue that competition prevents parties from learning about the
optimal saliency strategy from their domestic competitors. However, since parties do not compete
transnationally, our theory expects parties to learn from other parties across national borders.
Our empirical analysis is based on party manifestos from twenty-five EU countries1 in the per-
iod from 1975 to 2015. We focus on the parties’ emphasis on the environment – an issue with a
high valence component and a niche party as the unequivocal issue owner (Spoon, Hobolt and de
Vries 2014). The analysis provides evidence that parties systematically learn from saliency strat-
egies adopted by successful foreign family members, creating interdependencies among European
party systems. Our research strategy also enables us to show that conscious learning, instead of
mere imitation or the independent adaptation of similar strategies, is responsible for the observ-
able transnational diffusion process – a distinction that poses severe difficulties for empirical
analyses (Butler et al. 2017; Gilardi 2010; Shipan and Volden 2008).
At the domestic level, however, we find that competition impedes learning. Here, parties are
not affected by the valence strategies of their domestic competitors, and only the electoral success
of the issue owner exerts a non-linear effect on mainstream parties’ saliency strategies. Due to the
learning mechanism identified here, this effect of the domestic issue owner indirectly alters the
saliency strategies of parties across the borders as well.
The study contributes to the literatures on party competition and policy diffusion in at least
two decisive ways. First, we extend the argument about the transnational diffusion of parties’
position-taking strategies presented elsewhere (for example, Böhmelt et al. 2016; Böhmelt et al.
2017) to saliency strategies. Due to the distinct logic of issue competition, we identify different
diffusion patterns for valence issues as compared to positional issues. Secondly, we demonstrate
that the mechanism underlying the diffusion process is conscious learning. While previous
research struggled to differentiate learning from imitation, or even similar but independent policy
choices, our empirical strategy enables us to demonstrate that only conscious learning by strategic
parties is supported by the data.
When do Parties Emphasize Valence Issues?
Prior to an election, parties attempt to attract voters by formulating policy proposals in their
manifestos. In doing so, they single out a number of issues that are most rewarding in terms
of votes and allocate the scarce space within their manifestos to these issues, given the other par-
ties’ strategies (Laver and Garry 2000). This process, however, is dramatically complicated by the
fact that parties act in a low-information environment in which uncertainty is ubiquitous. As they
do not know whether clearly pronouncing their position on conflictual issues or campaigning on
valence issues will attract the most votes, allocating manifesto space to issues is a difficult task.
Even polls cannot provide the necessary information since they do not identify why citizens
vote as they do (for example, Budge 1994; Somer-Topcu 2009).
Below, we elaborate on the parties’ repertoire of electoral strategies, differentiate between
position-taking and saliency strategies, and derive novel expectations about the diffusion of
1The analysis includes all EU member states except Croatia, Malta and Romania.
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party strategies within and beyond the boundaries of national political systems. While we theorize
that the transnational diffusion of saliency strategies follows similar patterns as the diffusion of
position-taking strategies, we expect to find differences at the domestic level that are caused by
the distinct ways in which parties compete on conflictual and consensual issues as well as the
informational content of other parties’ strategic choices.
Parties’ Position-Taking and Saliency Strategies
In an influential article, Stokes (1963) points to several shortcomings of the dominant spatial
model of party competition proposed by Downs (1957). Most notably, he outlines the importance
of valence issues for party competition. In contrast to positional issues, valence issues are char-
acterized by a consensus of the goal of any policy within the electorate. Since the preferences
of parties and voters are not distributed over a finite set of policy alternatives but converge at
a single position, these issues do not fit the logic of the Downsian model (Curini and Martelli
2015; Green 2007; Stokes 1963). Instead of choosing a party based on ideological proximity,
voters evaluate parties based on their competence with respect to the issue. The party that the
electorate perceives to be the most competent wins the election.
In an electoral campaign, parties can either invest their resources in an attempt to attract votes
based on their ideological stances, or they can decide to campaign on consensual policies and
socially shared values by emphasizing valence issues (for example, Ceron and Curini 2016;
Green 2007).2 However, the differentiation between positional and valence issues has profound
implications for the electoral strategies parties employ.
Position-taking strategies directly emerge from the Downsian model and are based on the prem-
ise that voters will choose the party closest to their most preferred policy position in a latent policy
space that is assumed to be low dimensional and static. By explicitly stressing their policy platform
on conflictual issues, parties attempt to occupy the vote-maximizing position – conditional on their
competitors’ locations – and communicate their policy preferences to the electorate. Consequently,
these strategies are concerned with identifying and occupying an optimal policy position.
By contrast, valence issues are characterized by an almost unanimous agreement among the
electorate about the most preferred policy. As a result, parties cannot rely on their repertoire
of position-taking strategies to maximize their respective vote share. Instead, they need to single
out the issues on which they are perceived to be the most competent. Therefore, parties’ saliency
strategies concentrate on selectively emphasizing advantageous issues on which the voters per-
ceive them to be the most competent (for example, Budge 2015). A party that is able to increase
the saliency of issues on which it has a good reputation in the electorate will fare better in an
electoral contest.
In general, parties face different kinds of uncertainty regarding the identification of an optimal
electoral strategy. Regarding confrontational issues on which voters’ preferences are distributed
over the policy space, parties lack accurate information on the precise preference configuration
in the electorate and the other parties’ policy stances (for example, Ezrow et al. 2019). With
respect to consensual issues, the uncertainty parties face stems from the lack of information
about voters’ assessments of the parties’ competence on each issue. These differences have
important implications for the parties’ ability to use the other parties’ decisions as heuristics
in order to mitigate the uncertainty. For confrontational issues, the strategic choices of rival par-
ties reveal valuable information that improve a party’s ability to determine its optimal position-
taking strategy. For valence issues, however, the information revealed by competing parties’ deci-
sions does not help a party to infer its relative competence, or reveal which party is perceived to
be the most competent on other issues relevant in an electoral contest.
2As Stokes (1963, 373) notes, there is no a priori classification of issues as either positional or valence. Rather, the distinc-
tion needs to be justified on empirical grounds.
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Transnational Learning in the European Multilevel System
In their search for information, parties can rely on information from the outside of the party sys-
tem they act in. Based on these additional pieces of information, parties are able to develop heur-
istics, broadly defined as a ‘decision-making rule of thumb that can in practice be very effective’
(Laver and Sergenti 2012, 25). In a nutshell, heuristics are cognitive shortcuts that enable parties
to identify and select the most promising strategy from a set of feasible strategies. Depending on
their electoral performance, other parties can serve as role models for electoral success. Thereby,
parties might adopt electoral strategies that have been proven to be successful elsewhere.
The literature on policy diffusion provides convincing evidence of diffusion processes across
national borders (for example, Berry and Baybeck 2005; Butler et al. 2017; Gilardi 2010;
Volden, Ting and Carpenter 2008). In their analysis, Böhmelt et al. (2016) investigate trans-
national interdependencies in parties’ position-taking strategies (see also Böhmelt et al. 2017;
Ezrow et al. 2019). In line with previous research (for example, Laver and Sergenti 2012;
Somer-Topcu 2009), the authors argue that electoral uncertainty crucially limits parties’ ability
to decide on a vote-maximizing position before an election. Since they are unable to easily iden-
tify an optimal policy position, parties emulate the positional strategies of foreign parties that suc-
cessfully obtained governmental offices. As Ezrow et al. (2019) show, this emulation is rewarding
electorally as it helps parties identify the position of the domestic median voter.
Although these studies solely examine transnational diffusion processes with respect to the
parties’ position-taking strategies, there is no reason to believe that the mechanism is limited
to positional issues. Indeed, parties might use similar heuristics to decide whether prioritizing
valence issues in their manifestos pays off on Election Day. In this regard, parties have informa-
tion about the other parties’ saliency strategies and electoral performance, which helps them
evaluate the prospective benefit of emphasizing valence issues. Hence, we expect to find similar
transnational diffusion patterns for position-taking and saliency strategies.
Prior studies have not identified the exact underlying mechanism that causes party strategies to
diffuse transnationally (Volden, Ting and Carpenter 2008). While several different mechanisms
might underlie transnational diffusion processes, the mechanism of key interest in many of these
studies is conscious learning.3 Berry and Baybeck present the following general definition of
learning: ‘When confronted with a problem, decision makers simplify the task of finding a solu-
tion by choosing an alternative that has proven successful elsewhere’ (2005, 505). Empirically
showing that learning is the underlying diffusion mechanism, however, remains an elusive task
since it requires researchers to measure success. This challenge leads Volden, Ting and
Carpenter to conclude that, ‘despite decades of study, systematic evidence that governments
learn from one another has been limited’ (2008, 319). Assuming that parties instrumentally
seek to gain votes, this limitation is less severe in the context of electoral competition since suc-
cess can be quantified by the party’s change in vote share between two consecutive elections
(Graham, Shipan and Volden 2013).
Clearly, not every successful party is equally likely to serve as a role model for all other parties. It
seems unreasonable to expect that, for example, the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP)
learns about successful strategies from a regionalist party in another party system like the
Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) in Spain, or vice versa. By examining who becomes a potential
role model for other actors, Gilardi (2010) illustrates the conditional nature of learning processes.
He shows that ideological similarity facilitates the transfer of information and policies among the
entities. Parties are more responsive to the experiences of ideologically similar parties, which
makes them more likely to adopt saliency strategies that are similar to the strategies of successful
members of their own party family (Butler et al. 2017; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2015).
3The diffusion mechanisms primarily discussed are learning, (economic) competition, imitation (also referred to as emu-
lation or socialization) and coercion. For a comprehensive discussion of these processes, see Graham, Shipan and Volden
(2013) and Shipan and Volden (2008).
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Another distinction that affects a party’s learning behavior is the one between mainstream and
niche parties. Niche parties are characterized by their selective and exclusive focus on issues that
were previously outside the political discourse and are unaligned with the dominant party posi-
tions (Meguid 2005, 347f). While mainstream parties are more responsive to other parties’ issue
agendas, niche parties are less affected by the other parties’ behaviors. Learning is therefore more
likely to occur among established mainstream parties than among niche parties (Green-Pedersen
and Mortensen 2015). Referring to the example above, it is therefore reasonable to expect the
Swedish SAP to learn, for example, from the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) while the
Spanish ERC, given their niche party character, is unlikely to take cues from other parties.
In principle, learning from other parties can occur in two ways. First, parties can learn from
the successes of other parties and simply copy the strategies of those that have proven successful.
Second, other parties’ failures can provide valuable information about the likely consequences of
a strategic choice with respect to valence issues (for example, Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 351). If a
party performed poorly in the last election, other parties will be less inclined to adopt similar
strategies. Following this line of argumentation, the first hypotheses are:
HYPOTHESIS 1a (Foreign Winner Hypothesis): Parties emphasize valence issues when parties from
the same party family in other countries were successful with this strategy.
HYPOTHESIS 1b (Foreign Loser Hypothesis): Parties de-emphasize valence issues when parties
from the same party family in other countries were unsuccessful with emphasizing these issues.
It is important to note that, without further assumptions, this line of reasoning does not imply
that parties in European party systems will ultimately converge to a stable long-run equilibrium of
issue emphasis. For this to occur, voters’ demand for such issues would have to remain stable over
time. If, instead, voters’ demands for certain policy issues vary over time, a party learning from
another party that was successful in an election three years ago might not be successful in the
future due to changes in the demand side. As a result, other parties will turn to the strategies
adopted by alternative parties that have been successful, which implies that no convergence
takes place because the underlying demand has changed. Hence, our argument does not suggest
a convergence to a long-run equilibrium of issue emphasis.
So far, we expect similar transnational diffusion patterns for position-taking and saliency strat-
egies. Yet unlike Böhmelt et al. (2016), who conclude that parties merely emulate each other’s
strategies, we expect parties to condition their learning behavior on the observed outcome. If a
strategy was electorally rewarding, it will be adopted elsewhere. Otherwise, similar parties in
other polities will turn away from strategies that were unsuccessful elsewhere.
Domestic Issue Competition and the Party System Agenda
Domestic factors are indisputably crucial to understanding parties’ saliency strategies. While prior
studies have identified numerous factors that may affect parties’ saliency profiles, we argue that
the structure of domestic party competition conditions their ability to learn from one another
(Berry and Baybeck 2005). Moreover, since parties compete differently on conflictual and consen-
sual issues, we predict that the diffusion of saliency strategies is distinct from the process govern-
ing the diffusion of position-taking strategies.
Since Robertson (1976), the idea that parties primarily compete by focusing on different issues
rather than engaging in direct opposition during a campaign has been well established; it has led
to the development of several saliency-based theories of party competition.4 These theories have
increasingly gained importance as empirical studies have provided evidence of the prominence of
4Theories focusing on issue saliency come in many slightly different forms, including saliency theory (e.g., Budge and
Farlie 1983; Robertson 1976), issue ownership theory (e.g., Petrocik 1996) and the agenda-setting literature (e.g.,
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valence issues in Western European countries (for example, Elias, Szöcsik and Zuber 2015;
Green-Pedersen 2007; Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries 2014).
Issue competition is understood as parties’ struggle over which issues dominate the political
agenda (Carmines and Stimson 1993). In line with the saliency theory developed by Budge and
Farlie (1983) and the issue ownership theory (Petrocik 1996), parties talk about issues they want
to put on the political agenda. Their electoral campaigns are designed to selectively emphasize
issues on which the electorate perceives them to be the most competent, since these issues will bene-
fit the party that ‘owns’ them on Election Day. At the same time, parties simply ignore all other
issues that might benefit their competitors (Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996; Robertson 1976).
Importantly, the selective emphasis hypothesis directly counteracts parties’ learning efforts at
the domestic level. If a party successfully uses an issue to mobilize the electorate, competition
among domestic parties prevents its competitors from copying this strategy, irrespective of a
shared party family affiliation. Instead, the other parties will try to avoid this issue because
increasing its saliency will only be beneficial to the party that owns it (Budge and Farlie 1983;
Riker 1996; Robertson 1976). Hence, in stark contrast to position-taking strategies, we argue
that competition impedes learning at the domestic level.
HYPOTHESIS 2 (Party Competition Hypothesis): Parties’ emphasis on valence issues is not affected
by their domestic competitors’ strategies.
Yet numerous studies find a substantial proportion of issue convergence in the parties’ campaigns
(for example, Dolezal et al. 2014; Green-Pedersen 2007; Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries 2014). In an
attempt to reconcile this observation with the idea of party competition by selective issue emphasis,
Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2010) propose an agenda-setting model of issue competition. They
argue that a party’s issue attention is not only determined by party-specific characteristics, like pre-
ferences and issue ownership. Parties also need to consider the broader ‘party system agenda’
(Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010, 260), which is the sum of all issues relevant in an electoral
contest. While parties try to promote issues favorable to them, they simultaneously have to respond
to an agenda that is largely beyond their immediate control. The riding the wave theory (for example,
Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994; Klüver and Sagarzazu 2016; Spoon and Klüver 2015) argues that
parties have incentives to emphasize timely issues that are salient to the electorate, which forces
them to address issues owned by other parties. While parties wish to solely address issues favorable
to them, external factors cause them to consider other issues during their campaigns as well.
Taken together, electoral competition has a distinct effect on parties’ ability to learn about the
most successful strategy from other parties in their party system. Since competitors’ electoral for-
tunes can reveal valuable information about the policy preferences of the electorate, parties can
use this heuristic to identify the most promising position-taking strategy. Several studies provide
empirical evidence of these dependencies of position-taking strategies (for example, Adams and
Somer-Topcu 2009; Böhmelt et al. 2016; Williams 2015; Williams and Whitten 2015). At the
same time, our theory predicts that the saliency strategies employed by rival parties have no heur-
istical value. Observing other parties’ decisions does not provide any guidance on the optimal
saliency strategy as it does not allow parties to infer the voters’ assessment of the relative
competence of parties in a particular policy area.
Green Parties and the Environment
In order to study parties’ learning behavior with respect to valence issues, the present study
focuses on the parties’ emphasis on environmental issues in their manifestos. At least three cir-
cumstances make this issue especially interesting in this context.
Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; Riker 1996). Since they share similar core predictions about how party competition is
structured, we jointly refer to these theories as saliency-based theories (Budge 2015; Green and Hobolt 2008).
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First and foremost, the environment is recognized as an issue with a high valence component
(Abou-Chadi 2016; Carter 2013; Dolezal et al. 2014; Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries 2014). There is
overwhelming agreement among the electorate about the desire for environmental protection.
Although some parties have adopted a more critical stance on policies that foster environmental
protection, they are highly unlikely to actively demand an increase in air pollution or environ-
mental damage in their manifestos (Carter 2013, 76). These parties instead ignore the issue
altogether. Alternatively, Lowe et al. (2011) show that parties that oppose protective environmen-
tal policies might also employ more nuanced strategies: they highlight the cost of these measures
by contrasting environmental protection with economic prosperity. In general, while not all par-
ties take a pro-environmental stance, they avoid campaigning in favor of environmental destruc-
tion and either ignore the issue or frame it as contrasting priorities.
Secondly, environmental issues arose at roughly the same time on the political agendas of almost
all European countries. In the mid-1970s and early 1980s, green parties emerged all across Europe.
They politicized environmental issues and placed them on the political agenda, which had implica-
tions for the other parties’ strategies and the structure of party competition (Carter 2013). As the
politicization of environmental issues took place at approximately the same time in European party
systems, it is feasible to compare the parties’ adaptation to the new issue and the resulting trans-
formation of the political conflict within the respective party systems across countries.
Thirdly, green parties are the unequivocal and easily recognizable owner of environmental
issues (for example, Abou-Chadi 2016; Wagner and Meyer 2014). While it can be challenging
to identify the owner of other valence issues – like corruption (for example, Ceron and Curini
2016; Curini and Martelli 2015) – across different national contexts, environmental issues are
the defining feature of green parties. In line with this expectation, Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries
(2014, 366) report a strong and spontaneous association between environmental issues and
green parties among the electorate. It is easy for parties and voters to identify the party that ben-
efits from an increase in the issue’s saliency during a campaign in a given party system. Thus the
emergence and successes of green issue owners in European party systems forces the other parties
to develop strategies to deal with the new issue and their new competitor.
Of course, environmental concerns such as air pollution and climate change are not country-
specific but supranational challenges (Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries 2014, 364). On the one hand,
this similarity makes parties more likely to attempt to learn from the experiences of other parties
(for example, Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). They recognize that other parties have already
addressed the problem of whether to emphasize the valence issue or to campaign on conflictual
issues instead, which allows them to draw lessons from other parties’ behaviors. On the other
hand, common exposure to an external shock might lead parties to adopt similar strategies com-
pletely independently from one another. Our research design must therefore overcome the con-
siderable challenge of empirically disentangling learning from independent decision making in
this context (for example, Volden, Ting and Carpenter 2008).
Research Strategy
Case Selection and Dependent Variable
Our sample consists of all EU countries except Croatia, Malta and Romania. The countries’ simi-
larities and the formalized realm of the EU makes it an ideal setting in which parties can learn
from foreign parties (for example, Hix and Høyland 2013). In order to study parties’ learning
behaviors, we exclude green parties from the analysis. Since these parties are the issue owners,
the arguments put forth here may not apply. Given that an increase in the saliency of environ-
mental issues is beneficial for them, they have an incentive to pronounce this issue without the
need to learn about the likely consequences.5 Finally, we exclude regional, agrarian and other
5For a similar approach, see Abou-Chadi (2016) and Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries (2014).
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single-issue parties from the analysis and focus solely on mainstream parties’ saliency strategies.6
Appendix A lists all parties included in the analysis.
As discussed above, green parties started to politicize environmental issues between the
mid-1970s and early 1980s. We therefore focus on the period between 1975 and 2015. In contrast
to Meguid (2005), our analysis includes not only the years after a green party emerged but covers
the entire time span. Parties can change their saliency strategy towards valence issues in response
to various externalities, and they constantly monitor their performance. Indeed, it is crucial for
learning processes that the strategy applied can be altered. If parties do not change their strategies,
no learning occurs and the hypotheses are falsified. The Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP)
provides the data on issue saliency in party manifestos (Volkens et al. 2016). It codes quasi-
sentences within party manifestos for each election and assigns them to a set of pre-defined policy
categories. The proportion of quasi-sentences devoted to the environment ( per501) is the
dependent variable.
Modeling National and Transnational Dependencies
Empirically testing the support for our hypotheses in a time-series cross-sectional context
requires the specification of the dependence structure among parties. To this end, we use our the-
oretical predictions to specify different spatial lags and estimate spatio-temporal regression mod-
els. The spatial lags consist of the sum of the other units’ temporally lagged outcome variables,
weighted by four connectivity matrices. Based on our hypotheses, we specify four spatial lags
using different binary connectivity matrices to link the parties to one another. The connections
captured by these matrices allow us to differentiate the linkages among parties along two dimen-
sions: (1) electoral competition and (2) electoral success.
The first two matrices, WFW and WFL , connect all parties from the same party family that are
not in the same party system and, hence, do not compete electorally.7 In accordance with
Hypotheses 1a and 1b, these matrices capture transnational linkages among parties. WFW links
a party to all foreign parties with the same family affiliation that gained votes from the previous
to the most recent election in order to capture the effect of successful role models. If parties i and
j are connected by this matrix, the cell entrance W
FW
ij takes a value of 1, and 0 otherwise.
Similarly, the cells of WFL take a value of 1 if parties i and j share a common family affiliation,
do not compete electorally, and if party j lost votes between the previous and most recent election.
We specify two additional spatial lags to evaluate Hypothesis 2 about the effect of domestic
competition on parties’ learning efforts. Similar to the two foreign spatial lags described above,
both domestic spatial lags connect parties from the same party family and differentiate between
successful (WDW ) and unsuccessful (WDL) domestic family members. Thus the only difference
between the two foreign spatial lags and the two domestic spatial lags is the presence of electoral
competition.8 Hypothesis 2 predicts that, in contrast to the parties’ position-taking strategies,
competition impedes learning with respect to saliency strategies.9 If a party faces no competitors
from the same party family in a given electoral contest, it cannot adjust its strategy in response to
6The argument made here about learning might not apply to these parties since their manifestos and their electorate are
narrowly centered on specific issues, which makes learning about other issues unnecessary. See Green-Pedersen and
Mortensen (2015) for empirical evidence of the responsiveness of mainstream parties to other domestic parties.
7The CMP provides a party’s family affiliation. The parties in the analysis belong to one of the following families: socialist,
social democratic, liberal, Christian democratic, conservative or nationalist.
8On average, each party has 0.49 family members within the same party system. To demonstrate that the results are not
merely driven by outliers, Appendix B reanalyzes the data by linking parties from the same ideological bloc (i.e., left, center
and right), which increases the average number of domestically connected parties in each electoral contest to 1.18 (for a simi-
lar approach, see e.g., Böhmelt et al. 2016; Böhmelt et al. 2017; Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009).
9For theoretical reasons, the connectivity matrices are not row-standardized. It seems reasonable to expect that exposure
plays a crucial role in learning (e.g., Neumayer and Plümper 2012). If the number of successful (or unsuccessful) parties
increases, a focal party is more likely to learn from these parties’ strategies (Shipan and Volden 2008, 842).
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the strategies adopted by domestic family members; thus both domestic spatial lags will be
restricted to zero.
Importantly, since the countries in our sample have different electoral cycles and information
about the other parties’ electoral success becomes available only after an election takes place, we
temporally lag the spatial lags (see also Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Böhmelt et al. 2016). For
the domestic spatial lags, we only consider the performance of family members in the last
national election. For the foreign spatial lags, we consider the behavior of foreign family members
in the most recent election that took place between the previous and current domestic electoral
contest. This lag structure mirrors the assumption that parties monitor the electoral fortunes of
foreign family members if the respective electoral contest took place after the most recent and
before the current domestic election. In addition to theoretical considerations that lead us to con-
clude that temporally lagged spatial lags are warranted, this time lag also considerably eases model
estimation and interpretation.10
Identification of the Diffusion Mechanism
Similarities in parties’ saliency strategies can be the result of different processes. Although our
argument is based on the notion that parties consciously learn from one another, it is possible
that they simply imitate the behavior of other parties. Alternatively, similarities in party strategies
might be caused by identical but independent responses to common exogenous circumstances.
While distinguishing between these alternative diffusion mechanisms has proven to be difficult
in empirical research (for example, Böhmelt et al. 2016; Butler et al. 2017; Gilardi 2010;
Shipan and Volden 2008), our research strategy enables us to derive testable implications from
the different processes. Table 1 illustrates that we can explicate distinct expectations regarding
the results that allow us to differentiate conscious learning from imitation (or emulation) and
independent decision making.
In order to distinguish learning from imitation, it is crucial to differentiate between family
members who increased their vote share and those who did not. If similarities in parties’ strategy
adaptation are simply the consequence of imitation, parties should be equally responsive to the
saliency strategies of all family members. By implication, the estimates for both foreign spatial
lags as well as the estimated for the domestic spatial lags would be identical. If parties are merely
imitating their national competitors or ‘riding the wave’ by responding to the voters’ issue prior-
ities, we would find a positive spatial pattern among domestic parties, irrespective of their elect-
oral performance. Instead, if parties selectively learn from other parties’ electoral fortunes, they
will adopt the strategies of successful family members or avoid strategies that have been unsuc-
cessful elsewhere. Finally, if parties are not responsive to other parties’ saliency strategies, the par-
ameter estimate associated with all four spatial lags should be statistically indistinguishable from
zero since the fixed effects included in the model control for similar exogenous circumstances.
Table 1. Expectations based on alternative diffusion mechanisms
Conscious learning Imitation (emulation) Independent decision making
Foreign WFW . 0 W
FW = WFL = 0 WFW = WFL = 0
WFL , 0
Domestic WDW . 0 W
DW = WDL = 0
WDL , 0 W
DW = WDL = 0
Note: cells shaded in gray illustrate the hypothesized mechanisms. Hypotheses 1a and 1b expect conscious learning at the transnational level
while Hypothesis 2 implies spatial independence at the domestic level.
10Specifically, temporally lagging spatial lags addresses the problem of simultaneity bias (e.g., Franzese and Hays 2007;
Hays, Kachi and Franzese 2010). Furthermore, this specification does not contain instantaneous feedback effects and higher-
order dependencies – unless researchers explicitly incorporate higher-order spatial lags (e.g., Whitten, Williams and Wimpy
2019).
British Journal of Political Science 9
Based on the theoretical discussion above, we can derive distinct testable implications that
allow us to assess the empirical support for our hypotheses. At the transnational level, we
argue that parties consciously learn from successful foreign family members. Consequently,
Hypothesis 1a expects that WFW . 0 while Hypothesis 1b implies that WFL , 0. Our expectation
at the domestic level is that parties are not affected by their competitors’ strategies. Accordingly,
our expectation with respect to Hypothesis 2 is that WDW = WDL = 0. The highlighted cells in
Table 1 illustrate the hypothesized empirical expectations formulated here.
In sum, and in contrast to previous studies (such as Böhmelt et al. 2016), our research strategy
enables us to identify the mechanism underlying the diffusion of party strategies.
Alternative Heuristics and Control Variables
We also test for alternative heuristics that might explain the parties’ strategy choice and their
emphasis on environmental issues. Besides the saliency strategies adopted by family members,
the electoral success of green parties in other countries might also have a direct impact on a party’s
emphasis on environmental issues. If green parties receive more votes in other countries, parties can
infer from this observation that environmental issues are important enough to the electorate to con-
dition their vote choice. To empirically test this alternative heuristic, we include the average vote
share of all foreign green parties lagged by one year (Avg Greenn−1) in our model.
11
Furthermore, instead of looking at members of their own party family at the domestic level,
parties might simply use the saliency strategy adopted by the current incumbent parties as a heur-
istic. Since incumbent parties successfully obtained office, imitating their campaign strategies
from the previous election can be electorally rewarding. Therefore, our model also accounts
for the mean environmental issue emphasis of incumbent parties at the domestic level prior to
the last national election (IncumbentDVt−1 ).
In addition to these alternative heuristics, we also include a battery of control variables. In line
with the agenda-setting literature, Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries (2014) find that the size of the
green issue owner positively affects the likelihood that mainstream parties will also highlight
environmental issues. An increase in green parties’ support indicates that these parties success-
fully placed environmental issues on the party system agenda, which forces other parties to
respond to ‘their’ issue (for example, Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; Green-Pedersen
and Mortensen 2015). To control for this possibility, we include the temporally lagged vote
share of the green parties within a party system (VSGreent−1).
Yet, saliency-based theories predict the reverse effect since responding to strong green parties
would boost the greens’ vote at the expense of the other parties (for example, Abou-Chadi 2016;
Meguid 2005). In order to address this ambiguity, we add a squared version of the variable
(VSGreen2t−1), which captures a possible curvilinear effect. A non-linear relationship might exist
since mainstream parties can change their strategies depending on the relative size of a green chal-
lenger. When confronted with weak green parties, mainstream parties may de-emphasize environ-
mental issues in an attempt to reduce the saliency of this issue. If domestic green parties get more
successful, however, they can establish the environmental issue on the party system’s agenda. Since
ignoring the issue becomes riskier for other parties, they must respond to this issue.
We also include the annual growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) one year prior to the
election (GDPn−1). Economic growth allows parties to emphasize issues others than the economy.
If the economic conditions are favorable, parties have more opportunities to focus on other issues,
and these issues will be more prominent during the electoral campaign (Spoon, Hobolt and de
Vries 2014). The data on annual economic growth comes from the World Bank (2017).
Whether or not a party is part of the (coalition) government at the time of the election might also
affect the likelihood that it will emphasize environmental issues (Abou-Chadi 2016; Green-Pedersen
11Since drafting a manifesto takes time, we include the average vote share of all foreign green parties one year prior to the
election (e.g., Spoon and Klüver 2015, 345).
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and Mortensen 2010; Spoon, Hobolt, and de Vries 2014). While governing parties have to deliver
and are held accountable for policy solutions, opposition parties do not face these limitations.
Therefore, they are less restricted by the party system agenda and can channel their attention to
issues advantageous to them. We use the ParlGov dataset (Döring and Manow 2015) and include
a dummy variable indicating the parties’ incumbency status at the time of election t (Incumbentt).
A party’s decision to emphasize environmental issues also depends on its previous electoral per-
formance (Abou-Chadi 2016; Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries 2014). We control for this by including a
variable that measures the parties’ previous vote share (VSt−1). Finally, we include a lagged depend-
ent variable (DVt−1) in the model to account for temporal autocorrelation as well as party and year
fixed effects to control for party-specific effects, common shocks and the saliency of environmental
issues among the electorate. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for all variables.
Results
Since the dependent variable – the parties’ emphasis on the environment – takes on values in the
unit interval, we estimate fractional logit models (Papke and Wooldridge 1996; Papke and
Wooldridge 2008).12 Table 3 presents the results of three model specifications. The first model
includes all possible confounding variables together with the two foreign spatial lags for testing
Hypotheses 1a and 1b while ignoring the effects of domestic family members. Model 2 includes
the spatial lags for competing parties from the same party family at the domestic level without
taking transnational linkages into account. Finally, the full model specification includes all
four spatial lags together with the possible confounding variables. Each model also features
party and year fixed effects to account for unit-specific heterogeneity and common exogenous
shocks like the nuclear disasters in Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011).
Coefficient Estimates
Before turning to the spatial effects, Table 3 shows that the first-order temporal coefficient is
insignificant in all model specifications, indicating that there is no path dependency in the parties’
emphasis on environmental issues. Rather, at each election, non-issue-owning parties determine
how to handle environmental issues without being constrained by their past record.13
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Mean s.d. Min Max
Y 0.042 0.036 0 0.228
DVt–1 0.041 0.036 0 0.228
WFW y 0.195 0.147 0 0.719
WFL y 0.260 0.205 0 0.895
WDW y 0.009 0.027 0 0.243
WDL y 0.010 0.026 0 0.254
VSGreent−1 2.258 3.302 0 14.350
AvgGreenn−1 2.315 1.981 0 8.117
GDPn−1 2.516 2.863 –7.3 11.889
Incumbentt 0.355 0.479 0 1
IncumbentDVt−1 0.036 0.029 0 0.155
VSt−1 17.456 13.567 0 67.880
12For a similar approach, see Ceron and Curini (2016) and Curini and Martelli (2015). Fractional logit models have the
additional advantage that they are able to handle zero-inflation and overdispersion by allowing the dispersion parameter to
differ from 1. As the dispersion parameter ψ in Table 3 indicates, the data is zero-inflated and the conditional variance is
smaller than the conditional mean, which signifies the appropriateness of our modeling approach.
13Moreover, while 10.10 per cent of the observations did not change the environmental issue emphasis between elections,
parties reduced the share of environmental quasi-sentences in their manifestos in 44.88 per cent of the cases and increased it
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We also find empirical evidence for the two alternative heuristics discussed above. First, parties
take the success of green parties in other countries as an indication of the voters’ demand for
green policies. If green parties become more successful abroad, a non-issue-owning party
becomes more likely to emphasize environmental issues in its manifesto. Secondly, parties per-
ceive incumbent parties as role models since these parties successfully obtained office.
Therefore, saliency strategies adopted by incumbent parties prior to the previous election are
likely to be copied by domestic challengers as these strategies have proven to be effective.
Regarding our main theoretical expectations outlined above, the analysis lends support for
Hypothesis 1a. The positive and statistically significant spatial coefficient θ1 indicates that parties
indeed monitor and react to the behavior of successful family members abroad. Saliency strategies
that have been proven useful are likely to be employed by parties with the same family affiliation
in other countries.14 However, the analysis does not support Hypothesis 1b. Rather than pursuing
different strategies than unsuccessful family members abroad, parties simply ignore other parties’
negative experiences. Thus, while successful members of the same party family in other polities
serve as role models, parties disregard unsuccessful strategies.
Table 3. Fractional logit model estimates of environmental issues emphasis
DV: issue emphasis (proportion)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant −3.080*** −2.998*** −3.091***
(0.555) (0.556) (0.556)
DVt−1 –1.512 –1.516 −1.527
(1.073) (1.076) (1.077)
u1WFW y 0.803*** – 0.809***
(0.298) (0.299)
u2WFL y –0.121 – −0.129
(0.244) (0.246)
u3WFW y – –0.207 0.001
(1.220) (1.225)
u4WDL y – –0.793 –0.824
(1.278) (1.276)
VSGreent−1 −0.199*** −0.198*** −0.202***
(0.043) (0.044) (0.043)
VSGreen2t−1 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
AvgGreenn−1 0.327** 0.362** 0.332**
(0.164) (0.162) (0.164)
GDPn−1 0.025 0.028* 0.025
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Incumbentt −0.047 −0.040 −0.047
(0.071) (0.071) (0.072)
IncumbentDVt−1 4.589*** 5.104*** 4.704***
(1.632) (1.654) (1.663)
VSt−1 0.010 0.010 0.010
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Party and ✓ ✓ ✓
Year FEs
ψ 0.0192 0.0193 0.0192
Observations 733 733 733
RMSE 0.0233 0.0236 0.0233
Note: standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (two tailed)
in 45.02 per cent. Since the difference between these proportions is statistically insignificant (p = 0.969), we conclude that a
reduction in issue emphasis occurs as often as an increase.
14Supplementary analyses reveal that the strength of the domestic issue owner does not condition the parties’ incentives to
learn from successful family members abroad (see Appendix C). Parties facing a strong domestic green party are as likely to
learn from their successful family members abroad as parties competing against a weak issue owner.
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Yet simply testing whether regression coefficients are statistically distinct from zero does not
constitute an exhaustive test of the suggested learning mechanism. Further implications must be
tested in order to distinguish learning from other forms of diffusion.
One testable implication of Hypotheses 1a and 1b is, for example, that the strategies of suc-
cessful parties should have a different effect than those of unsuccessful parties. Since successful
saliency strategies should be more likely to diffuse transnationally, the expectation is that θ1 > θ2,
irrespective of whether both coefficients are statistically different from zero. The difference
between these spatial coefficients is θ1− θ2 = 0.938 with an associated 95 per cent confidence
interval of [0.180;1.696], indicating that there is a significant difference between both coefficients
and that the null hypothesis (θ1≤ θ2) can be rejected with p = 0.015.
Importantly, this finding supports the notion that the diffusion of saliency strategies is not
only attributable to mere imitation or independent strategy adaptation. Rather, parties systemat-
ically take cues from electorally successful family members in other European countries. Hence,
the transfer of saliency strategies from one country to another is the result of strategic decisions
taken by the parties (for example, Böhmelt et al. 2016; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996).
Table 3 further shows that the situation at the domestic level is quite different. Both domestic
spatial coefficients, θ3 and θ4, are statistically indistinguishable from zero. This finding is in line
with Hypothesis 2. If another party within the party system successfully mobilized the electorate
on the basis of a valence issue, a focal party cannot learn from this since both parties compete
electorally and the party that has successfully used this strategy has an advantage. Hence, the
information revealed by the success of competing parties regarding the utility of a saliency strat-
egy does not serve as a heuristic for a focal party. As outlined above, this is because the observed
success of a competitor does not allow a party to infer how voters perceive its own competence on
that issue, or the competence of all competing parties on any alternative issue.
Hypothesis 2 further expects that, unlike party family members abroad, parties’ electoral suc-
cesses should not matter since parties cannot learn from their domestic competitors. An F-test
fails to reject the joint null hypothesis θ3 = θ4 = 0. (p = 0.780) which suggests that, at the domestic
level, parties neither learn from nor imitate each others’ saliency strategies.
In sum, while parties learn from members of their party family abroad, they do not respond to
the saliency strategies employed by domestic members of their own party family. Even more, as
parties are unaffected by the strategies of their competitors, our analysis suggests that parties are
not ‘riding the wave’ by converging on the issues that are most important to the electorate.15
What distinguishes domestic and foreign party family members is the fact that parties compete
for votes at the domestic level. In line with saliency-based theories, competition impedes learning
among parties. If a domestic competitor successfully emphasizes a specific issue, the other parties
in the same party system cannot easily increase their vote share by adopting the same strategy. As
a result, domestic competitors cannot serve as role models.
Average Marginal Short-Term Effects
To meaningfully interpret these estimates, we calculate the average marginal effects (AME) of the
spatial short-term effects for each spatial lag.16 Short-term effects are computed by multiplying
the spatial coefficient by a unit’s number of connections.17 They indicate the instantaneous
15Appendix D provides an empirical assessment of the riding the wave hypothesis.
16More precisely, two obstacles complicate the substantive interpretation. First, due to the estimation of a fractional logit
model, the link function maps the systematic component to the unit interval and the estimated coefficients only display the
relative proportion ratios for a unit increase in the associated predictor variable, holding everything else constant. Secondly,
since the connectivity matrices are not row-standardized, the spatial coefficients cannot be interpreted directly because their
effect for each unit depends on the number of connections it has. The unequal number of links impedes a comparison of the
effect size among the different units.
17The average number of connections per observation is 4.53 for WFW , 5.86 for WFL , 0.23 for WDW , and 0.26 for WDL .
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impact – that is, the direct effect before any feedback occurs – of the spatial lags on the outcome
variable for each unit, taking into account the differences in the number of connections (Plümper
and Neumayer 2010). The AMEs of these spatial short-term effects are obtained by first calcu-
lating the spatial short-term effects for each unit. Subsequently, we compute the marginal effects
of the obtained vector of individual spatial short-term effects given the other covariate values
observed in the data and take the average. Figure 1 illustrates these quantities together with simu-
lated uncertainty estimates.18
The interpretation of these AMEs is straightforward. All else equal, a one-unit increase in the
spatial lag WFWy increases the share of quasi-sentences dedicated to environmental issues within
a focal party’s manifesto on average by 39.90 per cent [9.91 per cent; 78.94 per cent]. At first sight,
this number appears to be surprisingly high. However, when considering the variable’s descriptive
statistics and the substantive implications of a unit increase, it becomes clear that this situation is
very unlikely to happen. A one-unit increase would mean that, for example, one party family
member who increased its vote share in the last election increased the share of environmental
quasi-sentences within the manifesto from 0 per cent to 100 per cent.
Of course, there are more realistic scenarios that facilitate the interpretation. Consider a party
with four successful family members abroad, which is the median number of foreign successful
family members in the data. Each of these parties has increased the share of quasi-sentences on
environmental issues in their manifestos from one standard deviation below the mean (0.58 per
cent) to one standard deviation above the mean (7.78 per cent). Based on the AME, this change in
the other parties’ issue emphasis leads to an expected increase in the share of environmental
quasi-sentences within the focal party’s manifesto of 11.50 per cent [2.86 per cent; 22.75 per
cent], ceteris paribus.
It may be the case that the low number of domestic family members in the party system (each
party competes against 0.49 domestic family members, on average) gives too much weight to out-
lier electoral contexts. As a robustness check, we changed the specification of our connectivity
matrices. Instead of their family affiliation, the new matrices connect parties based on their ideo-
logical bloc membership. We follow Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009, 834) and classify commun-
ist and social democratic parties as ‘left’, liberals as ‘centrist’, and conservative, Christian
democratic and nationalist parties as ‘right’.19 Doing so increases the average number of
Figure 1. Average Marginal Effects of the Spatial Short-Term Effects. The horizontal bars indicate the simulated 95 per cent
confidence interval
18We simulate coefficients based on 10,000 random draws from a multivariate normal distribution where the mean vector
consists of the coefficient estimates obtained from Model 3 and the corresponding variances come from the estimated
variance-covariance matrix.
19Recall that in our analysis, we omit green parties as well as regional, agrarian and other small single-issue party families.
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neighbors to 1.18. We present the results of these models in Section B of the Appendix. The ana-
lysis confirms that the substantive inferences presented above also hold if we assume that parties
are connected by their bloc membership rather than their family affiliation.
These results provide strong evidence in favor of transnational dependencies among parties’
saliency strategies. While parties learn from their successful family members in foreign polities
about when it is beneficial to pronounce valence issues, they are not affected by the strategies
adopted by unsuccessful family members abroad. The significant difference between the two for-
eign spatial lags indicates that conscious learning is responsible for the transnational diffusion of
saliency strategies. At the same time, domestic competition impedes learning. As we have argued
above, this finding is in line with saliency-based theories of party competition. Enhancing the
saliency of an issue benefits the party that voters perceive to be the most competent in the
respective policy area. Consequently, parties cannot simply copy successful strategies from
their competitors, as this would increase the issue saliency and eventually their competitors’
vote share.
Simulation Study: Transnational Spillover Effects
That is to say, not all domestic parties are irrelevant for the selection of saliency strategies. As
predicted by saliency-based theories, Table 3 shows that the strength of the domestic issue
owner crucially affects the likelihood that other parties will emphasize the valence issue. In
accordance with the findings presented by Abou-Chadi (2016), the negative and statistically sig-
nificant coefficient of electoral support for an issue owner indicates that non-green parties
de-emphasize environmental issues when confronted with strong issue owners.20 Moreover,
the statistically significant quadratic term suggests that the relationship between green parties’
support and the other domestic parties’ emphasis on environmental issues is non-linear and
has a minimum within the empirical range of the data (at an issue owner’s vote share of 9.353
per cent). While parties try to de-emphasize and ignore environmental issues when confronted
with a weak issue owner, the analysis reveals a diminishing effect of the green parties’ strength
on the other parties’ emphasis on the valence issue.21
Importantly, due to the spatial dependence, green issue owners indirectly affect non-issue
owners in other party systems as well. Since they induce domestic competitors to de-emphasize
environmental issues in their manifestos, foreign family members copying these strategies are also
affected by the green parties’ electoral support in these countries. Of course, the possibility that
green parties will indirectly induce foreign parties to downplay environmental issues depends on
the electoral success of the domestic competitor. As discussed above, whether a party serves as a
role model for other parties’ electoral strategies in foreign polities depends on the party’s electoral
performance. Since parties learn selectively from successful foreign family members, the possibil-
ity of a spillover effect depends not only on the level of support for a green party but also on the
electoral successes of its competitors. A simulation exercise based on Model 3 in Table 3 helps to
quantify these spillover effects.22
To illustrate these transnational spillover effects of the strength of a domestic issue owner, take
the Swedish Riksdag election in 2010 as an example. In the general election in 2006, the Swedish
Green Party (MP) received 5.24 per cent of the votes, which is more than twice the average pre-
vious vote share of green parties in the sample (see Table 2). Hence, the Swedish parties were
already confronted with a comparatively strong issue owner. Despite this, the conservative
20Note that the model includes spatial and temporal dependencies and the estimated effects of all covariates only provide
information about the pre-dynamic effects (see also Hays, Kachi and Franzese 2010).
21See Appendix E for a more detailed investigation of the non-linear effect of the domestic green parties’ vote share on its
competitors.
22Again, the results are based on 10,000 random draws from a multivariate normal distribution, which takes the para-
meters obtained from Model 3 as inputs.
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Moderate Party (M), the only successful party in our dataset in that election as measured by the
change in vote share, devoted 10.18 per cent of its manifesto to the environment. If the Green
Party’s vote share in 2006 was twice as high, our model predicts that the Moderate Party reduces
the amount of quasi-sentences concerning the environment to 6.37 per cent [2.92 per cent; 10.62
per cent].
Since the Moderate Party was able to increase its vote share in 2010 as compared to the elec-
tion in 2006, our theory suggests that it served as a role model for conservative parties in other
countries. By changing the observed issue emphasis for the Moderate Party to the median pre-
dicted share of 7 per cent, we can simulate the transnational spillover effects caused by changes
in the electoral success of the Swedish issue owner in the 2010 general election. Figure 2 illustrates
the predicted change in environmental issue emphasis of conservative parties in other countries;
the colors indicate the magnitude of the change. Gray shaded countries depict polities that are
part of our sample, but no conservative party competed in the most recent election after the
Swedish general election in September 2010.23
As Figure 2 shows, our simulation study predicts that Silvio Berlusconi’s People of Freedom
(PdL) in Italy would have reduced its emphasis on the environment in the 2013 general election
Figure 2. Simulated transnational spillover effects from a change in the Swedish Green Party’s previous vote share in 2010
on conservative parties
23Note that in the general elections in Spain (2011) and France (2012), two conservative parties participated in the election.
To ease the visual presentation of the results, Figure 2 depicts the average change in the conservative parties’ issue emphasis
per country.
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by –0.14 percentage points, a reduction of about 2.25 per cent. Similarly, while the Slovenian
Democratic Party (SDS) dedicated 6.85 per cent of its manifesto for the 2011 general election
to the environment, the increase in the electoral strength of the Swedish Green Party would
reduce this share by -0.11 percentage points, or 1.58 per cent, despite the fact that these parties
are not directly connected. Therefore, the predicted reduction in environmental issue emphasis
for the Swedish Moderate Party, which was caused by changes in the domestic issue owner’s elect-
oral support, affects the saliency strategies of conservative parties in other European countries.
Although the size of these spillover effects might appear to be negligible at first, their substan-
tive importance becomes more obvious once we compare them to the overall distribution of
environmental issue emphasis in our sample. On average, each party in our sample dedicates
only about 4.18 per cent of its manifesto to environmental issues. Hence, the reduction reported
in our simulation, despite its seemingly small magnitude, is of substantive importance.
In addition, the implications of these transnational spillover effects are highly relevant. These
simulations illustrate a non-trivial dependence structure among European party systems that even
goes beyond the direct impact of transnationally connected parties. Domestic pressures arising
from political competition within a single party system can indirectly affect parties in other
party systems even if they do not directly interact at all. Since parties use the electoral perform-
ance of foreign family members as a heuristic to systematically learn about successful saliency
strategies, domestic circumstances within these foreign party systems can spill over to other
party systems. These results demonstrate how electoral support for the Swedish Green Party,
for example, affects the behavior of several conservative parties, although these foreign parties
are not directly connected to the domestic issue owner in Sweden.
Conclusion
How do parties decide when to campaign on valence issues given a high degree of uncertainty? So
far, the scholarly literature has focused on characteristics of the party and the domestic party sys-
tem to explain why parties decide to talk about valence issues in their manifestos. By following
the proposition that parties strategically draft their manifestos in order to increase their vote share
(for example, Laver and Garry 2000), the present work adds to this literature by illuminating both
direct and indirect transnational dependencies in parties’ saliency strategies. The explanation pro-
vided here is based on conscious learning as a mechanism for parties to mitigate uncertainty and
for the diffusion of electoral strategies across national borders.
The results can be summarized in three key points. First, parties dynamically adapt their strat-
egies to the specific context of an electoral campaign. Instead of sticking to their previous strategy,
parties manipulate the way they emphasize valence issues. Secondly, parties systematically take
cues from members of their party family in foreign polities. The analysis provides evidence
that conscious learning from successful family members about the most beneficial electoral strat-
egy is the underlying mechanism causing saliency strategies to diffuse transnationally. Finally, at
the domestic level, electoral competition hinders learning. Here, the issue owners’ electoral sup-
port exerts a non-linear effect on mainstream parties’ strategy selection. While mainstream par-
ties seek to de-emphasize environmental issues when confronted with a weak issue owner, the
effect diminishes once the issue-owning niche party rallies enough support among the electorate.
Our analysis reveals that European party systems are not independent and hermetically sealed
systems with no connections to one another. Rather, the parties acting in these systems create
transnational linkages to mitigate electoral uncertainty (see also Böhmelt et al. 2016; Böhmelt
et al. 2017; Ezrow et al. 2019). They systematically seek information on the other parties’ strategies
and their electoral performance as a heuristic to determine when it is potentially vote maximizing
to emphasize valence issues. Besides the direct impact of role models in foreign party systems, the
analysis also identifies spillover effects that indicate non-trivial interdependencies among
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European party systems. Transnational dependencies are not nuisances, but conscious decisions
made by strategic actors in a low-information environment.
These insights have important implications for future research. While the present study pri-
marily focuses on the direct impact of conscious learning on foreign parties’ strategies in order
to establish the existence of transnational dependencies, the spatial spillover effects identified
here deserve more scholarly attention. Despite the small magnitude of these effects, they highlight
an important feature of European party systems: their interrelatedness. Domestic pressures arising
from electoral competition in one country can affect the electoral strategies of other parties and
eventually the course of policy making in foreign polities even if these parties are not directly
linked.
Moreover, since the specific institutional design defines the boundaries in which party com-
petition takes place, institutional features like the electoral system or a party’s organizational
structure might affect its ability to learn. Further research on the effects of these institutional fea-
tures on the parties’ learning behavior is needed. Finally, this study focuses on a single issue
dimension. To further validate these findings, future research should pay closer attention to
the multidimensional nature of electoral strategies and investigate transnational learning in the
context of multiple issue dimensions.
Supplementary material. Online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123420000769.
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